







 In the face of the processes of unification of Europe and the confrontation with the 
influence non-European cultures, there appear from time to time questions about 
European identity.  Although a majority of people intuitively apprehend the cultural 
specificity of our continent, they have, as a rule, some difficulty with precisely defining 
this identity.  The following text sets for itself a quite humble task.  Namely, it proposes 
to work towards such a definition, referring to issues which are generally known to 
specialists, but of which the larger public is not always cognizant.  Because it has a 
popularizing character, it does not include references to the voluminous literature on the 
subject. 
 
                                                                         * 
 
 In asking about European identity, we are asking above all about the dominant and 
specific features of European culture.  By the latter, in turn, we commonly mean the set of 
most widely accepted outlook-shaping and axiological (value-forming) convictions, 
which find their expression in religion, the law, morality, art, science, and politics.  The 
basic problem is that these convictions have undergone historical and geographical 
differentiation.  This means, among other things, that questions about European identity at 
once lead to questions about what we mean by “Europe,” and from what time we date its 
origins. When we speak of Europe do we include classical antiquity?  Do we include the 
Middle Ages?  Or are we speaking of the modern or indeed only of the contemporary era?  
Shall we acknowledge, for example, Andalusia under the rule of the Moors as part of 
Europe, or not?  Shall we abstract from the many geographically determined versions of 
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European culture and try to delineate some trans-regional features, or should we rather try 
to emphasize the relative distinctiveness of those versions?  The issue is thus quite 
complicated, and every attempt to same something about Europe “in general” will of 
necessity lead to considerable simplification.  If, however, we are to do this we must 
remember that Europe, taken as a cultural unity, is always the result of a certain 
construction, of the use of ideal types, to use Max Weber’s famous term; that is to say of 
schematized models which, for research purposes, have been abstracted from a plethora of 
empirical facts and which concentrate only on those features which in the view of the 
researcher are the most significant.  Every model which goes by the name of “Europe” or 
“European culture” is, therefore, the result of a certain outlook, a certain design, the result 
of an emphasis on one thing at the expense of another, and will as a rule express a moral 
and also a political choice.  In this sense I do not believe that there can exist a kind of 
“Europe in itself,” but rather that we have a vision of the Europe that we would like there 
to be. We need, then, strength both of will and of imagination, in order to specify her 
identity, and hence the title of this article, an obvious parody of the title of Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s most famous work (The World as Will and Representation). 
 Keeping in mind the full complexity of the problem of “Europe” and the 
complexity of Europe itself, of the struggle within it of competing tendencies, we may 
feel inclined to sketch out certain things that we deem typical of European culture.  As a 
basic criterion of this kind of undertaking let us stipulate that we may speak of Europe (or 
more broadly of “the West”) in principle when its inhabitants assume that it exists.  
Thereby we are taking as the fundamental criterion for the question whether Europe 
exists, and on what its distinctiveness depends, the consciousness of its inhabitants.  And 
on this basis we may confess that Europe is a rather unsteady concept.  At all times her 
conceptualization has been largely the concern of the political and intellectual elite, while 
representatives of the common people at least up to the 19
th
 century considered 
themselves above all to be “locals,” generally having not only no idea of such a place as 
“Europe,” but little sense of any existence beyond the confines of their own village or 
town.  There is no space here to go into the gripping process of the historical evolution of 
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a consciousness of the existence of Europe; it will suffice to say that the ancient Greeks 
already divided the world into those who spoke Greek and the barbarians (that is, those 
who spoke gibberish).  The same tack was taken by the Romans, who considered to be 
barbarians all those who were not subjects of the Empire or who did not accept its laws 
and customs.  Typical of the Middle Ages would be the division between Christian and 
pagan, while in the modern era the basic dichotomy would become between West and 
East (the so-called Orient).  Consciousness of the distinctiveness and specificity of what 
we currently think of as Europe has always intensified in the face of conflict with others.  
One might say that a notion of Europe-in-itself became one of Europe-for-itself, to use 
this philosophical expression.  And here I would say that the present interest in the 
question of Europe and its identity results from, among other things, the conviction that 
we have once again to do with confrontation, struggle and conflict with those who 
constitute a threat to Europe or who may seem to be threatening to it. 
 So what does the identity of Europe depend upon?  What could be said to 
characterize it?  First of all, we may cite a propensity for self-criticism and self-reflection, 
an ability to subject to doubt one’s own convictions.  In this regard one might point out 
that the quite specific, dynamic, mutable and internally differentiated tradition of 
philosophy has always been a kind of laboratory of European thought.  No other culture 
possesses such a philosophical tradition, although this does not mean, of course, that 
Europe has had a monopoly on philosophical thought.  It means only that the philosophy 
of the West has been from the very outset a field of conflict, disagreement, and debate, 
the birthplace of new cognitive and axiological models, new ways of seeing the world.  It 
was this tradition that gave European thought a dynamism not found elsewhere, which 
became one of the tools in the process of European self-education.  The work of this 
philosophical tradition was carried on by science, which has by degrees absorbed it.  
Religion, and specifically Christianity, has also had an effect on the dynamism of Western 
culture.  Christianity has always been internally varied, and this variety led to reflection 
on religion and hence to theology, as a reflection on the nature of God, which developed 
over time.   Religious practice, too, in Europe has always been of its own kind, if we 
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consider the core meaning of the Reformation in internally transforming this practice 
from a “religion of fate” to a “religion of choice,” this latter not occurring anywhere 
outside of European culture.  And here it is worth mentioning the specifically European 
process of the so-called second disenchantment of the world, which was so well described 
by Max Weber.  In rough terms this means the separation from religious principles of 
social sub-practices such as science, the law, economics, and art, and their re-orientation 
towards their own regulatory values (for example, economics – efficiency and profit; 
science – truth; the law – normative fairness; art – originality and authenticity). 
 This already-mentioned dynamism was transferred from philosophical and 
religious thought into other spheres, including art and politics.  Nowhere has art been so 
stylistically diverse, nor has politics had such rich philosophical and intellectual 
resources, as in Europe, or more broadly speaking in the West.  (Let us recall that the 
West is a more capacious concept than Europe, in which are included regional cultures, 
such as American culture, that although deeply rooted in a European heritage nonetheless 
possess their own distinctiveness.)  Besides the development of philosophy and theology, 
another fruitful event for Europe, this time of an institutional nature, was the advent of 
universities (the first European universities were founded in Bologna and Paris during the 
12
th
 century).  They became places in which, thanks to the opportunity for debate and 
criticism, new ideas had a chance to arise, imparting to European culture a character of 
mutability and diversity.  The intellectual innovation of Europe that I have referred to led 
to the development of a specific European attitude which treated novelty as a value in 
itself.  This phenomenon appeared in the modern era, and in particular during the period 
of Romanticism.  It was then that we can detect the beginning of what historians of 
culture have called “the tradition [of seeking] that which is new.”  Romanticism also 
reinforced European individualism by propagating the cult of the creative genius and a 
mythology of the unique internal experience of each person, even though – paradoxically 
– it was also often to advocate expressis verbis communal values, which were, moreover, 
often based on tribal models.  Let us add to all the foregoing the birth and development of 
industry and technology, closely connected with the development of modern science in 
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Europe, and not occurring on such a scale anywhere else in the world.  (I say “on such a 
scale,” having in mind above all the dynamism of this growth and its effect on everyday 
life.  Let us note that Chinese culture, for example, boasts numerous discoveries and 
inventions which clearly preceded similar discoveries and inventions in Europe; however 
in China, these novelties never became basic dynamizing elements of the structure of 
everyday life.)  Interest in matters that were different and foreign – in a word, non-
European – resulting from an ability to manufacture otherness in itself, and finally, there 
was the historical rise of the strangest of all economic systems – capitalism (its birth is 
spoken of as a “European miracle”) – and an equally strange political system, democratic 
liberalism.  Add these elements together, and we receive a picture of a civilization which, 
as a network of mutually connected convictions and practices, is the most exotic of all. 
 What further determined this Sonderweg of Europe?  In order to answer this we 
must reach back to the roots of European culture.  There exists a broad consensus that 
these roots are connected with Greek philosophy (and further – with philosophy as such), 
Roman law, and Christianity.  To this I would add the tradition of the Enlightenment, 
which unquestionably had an influence on European identity during the modern era.  We 
have Greek philosophy to thank for, among other things, the idea of philosophical truth, 
the conception of theory, the technique of argumentation and scientific debate, the laws of 
classical logic, and a whole series of ideas on the subjects of cognition and ontology (for 
example, the differentiation between belief and real  knowledge, the Heraclitian dialectic, 
the atomism of Democritus, and Platonic idealism), and also axiological and political 
ideas (for example, the Socratic idea of care for the soul, the Platonic conception of the 
ideal state, and the Aristotelian conception of man as a political animal).  To later 
philosophy we are indebted for many other intellectual discoveries, among which for lack 
of space we might mention here only a few from the axiological and political spheres: the 
individual, reason of state, the separation of powers, the social contract, tolerance, the 
categorical imperative, sovereignty, autonomy, impartial justice, freedom of speech, etc.  
Here we must also once more mention the Enlightenment tradition, which we have to 
thank for, among other things, liberal democracy, the valorization of science and 
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education, individualism, anti-paternalism, the separation of church and state, the 
conception of a “perpetual peace” between nations, the idea of progress, the beginnings of 
the recognition of rights of women and children, and indeed, human rights.  The second 
pillar of European culture was Roman law, which introduced a whole range of principles 
which came to define the European legal tradition.  I am thinking now of, for example, 
ensuring that trials should proceed by due process of law (involving, among other things, 
the requirement that both sides of a case be heard, and a prohibition on double jeopardy), 
the principle that every accused person should have the right to a fair trial, the idea of 
natural law and the separation between natural and institutional law, the beginnings of the 
idea of a government of laws and of legal defense of private property, the description of 
contract law, the beginning of a distinction between civil and criminal law, and even 
international law.  The third pillar of European culture (in the order of their historical 
appearance) is unquestionably Christianity, to which we owe, among other things, the 
idea of a general brotherhood of man, the moral principle that one should love one’s 
neighbor as oneself (in general: the commandment of love and mercy), a conviction of 
fundamental human equality, the ethic of mutual assistance and of devoting oneself to the 
good of others, the idea of the existence of a kind of justice which transcends earthly 
justice, the separation of the order of God from the order of man (“Render unto Caesar the 
things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s”), a basis for a 
common temporal chronology (which had earlier been done by Jewish thinkers), and 
finally, faith in the fundamental purposefulness of history.  To complete this picture we 
ought to include the contribution of Judaism to the formation of European culture.  It is 
this tradition that we have to thank for the ethic of the Ten Commandments, faith in the 
formation of wisdom through learning, and the intellectual tradition of the interpretation 
of texts (initially, of course, mostly holy texts).  I have already mentioned the role of the 
Enlightenment in the development of the modern European identity, so here I should like 
only to add that in my opinion the Enlightenment and its ideas would not have been 
possible without Christianity, and that therefore the tension that exists between these two 
traditions I consider to be something on the order of a “family quarrel,” though I know 
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that this matter remains controversial.  However there can be no doubt that in general 
terms European culture has always flourished upon its internal diversity and upon the 
tensions that have existed between those diverse elements, and the conflict between 
Christianity and the Enlightenment tradition I deem to have been fruitful for the culture as 
a whole.  This tension can in any event be treated as an example of a much older 
phenomenon, dating back to the time of Constantine the Great, namely the tension 
between the claims of the lay powers and those of the religious authorities.  As Lord 
Acton noted many years ago, this conflict favored the gradual widening of the sphere of 
individual liberty and the liberation of the political dimension of social life from the 
dimension regulated by religious authority. 
 Many aspects of European culture, as I remarked earlier, are unique, very clearly 
demarcating Europe (the West) off from the rest of the world.  Something which in this 
context particularly bears mention is that to non-European cultures the following ideas 
remain to a certain degree foreign:  the separation of the temporal (lay) order from the 
supernatural (holy) order, the significance of the individual and its priority over the 
collectivity, the recognition of the state as representing the common good and as more 
important that the good of the clan or tribe, the concept of legal government, in which the 
rule of law governs rather than the whim of the ruler, the formal equality of men and 
women, the concept of human rights, and – last but not least – the idea of liberal 
democracy.  (We must recall that the theory and the practice of democracy we owe to 
classical Greece, although it is obvious that that was not a liberal democracy.)  
 In conclusion two further remarks can be made.  Firstly, we must remember that 
European culture is indebted in many ways to other cultures, from which it has learned 
much: the list of these other cultures would be long indeed, and here I shall mention only 





-century fascination with the Orient.  Secondly, it is quite 
necessary to point out Europe’s (and the West’s) exceptionally rich legacy of evil 
inventions.  It is here that mention must be made of the (pseudo)philosophically and 
(pseudo)scientifically justified ideas of racism, colonialism, xenophobia, and various 
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forms of totalitarianism.  Certainly this list of “sins” could be greatly extended.  But this 
could be considered beside the point.  What is important is that we must not fall into self-
congratulation.  Remembering that in European culture which is good, we must not forget 
what is bad.  Only then will our defense of European values be convincing also for non-
Europeans. 
